Since the turn of the century, China has emerged as India’s most prominent strategic adversary. The two countries share a border of 3,488 km, which runs from northwest of the Karakoram Pass to India’s eastern province of Arunachal Pradesh without any demarcation on the ground. The absence of an internationally accepted boundary paves the way for territorial dispute between the two Himalayan neighbours, compounded by a lack of agreement on where the de facto ‘Line of Actual Control’ (LAC) lies. The two countries have negotiated territorial disputes continuously since 1981, every single year, for the past 41 years. However, since 2013, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping has institutionalised China’s change of approach from ‘keeping a low profile’ (taoguangyanghui) to ‘strive for achievement’ (fenfayouwei) as an ideology driving China’s policy approach to its sovereignty and territorial issues, including in Tibet on the border with India (Desai 2021). Additionally, the recent landmark Chinese military reforms have set the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on a path to becoming a world-class force by 2049, a term yet to be defined by Xi. This combination of ideological change and on-the-ground force modernisation has made China more assertive on its borders, including the India–China border in Tibet. For instance, in the last decade, India and China were involved in at least five major standoffs, which included the 2020 Galwan clash. Recent events like the PLA’s purchase of combined maces and modernisation of Xinjiang and Tibet military districts highlight that the India–China border will remain tense for a while. However, despite being India’s biggest strategic adversary, the Chinese PLA is not studied as a discipline in India, like in the US or Taiwan. Amrita Jash’s book, The Concept of Active Defence in China’s Military Strategy, fills this research gap.
(China Report) Book review: The Concept of Active Defence in China’s Military Strategy
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Updated: Jan 18
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